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Abstract Defects in requirements specifications can have severe consequences
during the software development lifecycle. Some of them may result in poor
product quality and/or time and budget overruns due to incorrect or missing
quality characteristics, such as security. This characteristic requires special
attention in web applications because they have become a target for manip-
ulating sensible data. Several concerns make security difficult to deal with.
For instance, security requirements are often misunderstood and improperly
specified due to lack of security expertise and emphasis on security during
early stages of software development. This often leads to unspecified or ill-
defined security-related aspects. These concerns become even more challenging
in agile contexts, where lightweight documentation is typically produced. To
tackle this problem, we designed an approach for reviewing security-related
aspects in agile requirements specifications of web applications. Our proposal
considers user stories and security specifications as inputs and relates those
user stories to security properties via Natural Language Processing. Based
on the related security properties, our approach identifies high-level security
requirements from the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) to
be verified, and generates a reading technique to support reviewers in detect-
ing defects. We evaluate our approach via three experiment trials conducted
with 56 novice software engineers, measuring effectiveness, efficiency, useful-
ness, and ease of use. We compare our approach against using: (1) the OWASP
high-level security requirements, and (2) a perspective-based approach as pro-
posed in contemporary state of the art. The results strengthen our confidence
that using our approach has a positive impact (with large effect size) on the
performance of inspectors in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Requirements Engineering (RE) is an inherently complex part of software en-
gineering. Given its complexity, defects such as ambiguities, inconsistencies
and incomplete requirements may arise. These defects have been reported by
practitioners to be causing problems in software projects, such as poor product
quality and time and budget overruns [23]. Moreover, the costs for correcting
these RE-related problems increases throughout the software development life-
cycle [9]. These additional costs reinforce the importance of identifying such
defects at early stages.
The rapidly changing business environments in which many companies
operate are challenging traditional RE approaches. This gave rise to agile
methods for RE. Agile RE relies on lightweight documentation and face-to-
face collaborations between customers and developers [10]. Yet, agility does
not necessarily compensate for problems that have been reported for plan-
driven software process models (e.g., RUP, V-Model XT, Waterfall), such as
moving targets and communication flaws [23]. It can even make those problems
more explicit if a critical prerequisite for successful RE are not met: human-
intensive exchange, collaboration, and trust [24]. In other words, agile RE has
helped to address some RE problems, but it has also hindered others, such as
under-specified requirements that are too abstract [23].
Security is an essential Non-Functional Requirement (NFR) that requires
special attention of any software system that manages valuable data and pro-
cesses, among others, due to business needs to protect restricted user infor-
mation. Much of sensitive information is hosted on the internet, making web
applications an often favoured target. In today’s software systems, security
vulnerabilities are increasing [16] and ensuring security controls is becoming
more difficult. Defects in security requirements can lead to important vulner-
abilities that impact core functionality, leading to loss of reputation, financial
penalties, and even legal consequences. For instance, in September 2016, the
internet giant Yahoo announced it had been the victim of the biggest data
breach in history [25]. The hackers stole personal information of 500 million
users. The attack was performed via phishing emails with a link. Once it was
clicked, malware was downloaded to the network. Thus, bad actors gained ac-
cess to the user database. This can be seen as a breach not covered by the
security requirements. Not surprisingly, security is considered as a relevant
NFR for the 21st century [44].
For that reason, specifying and verifying security requirements is crucial
to ensure software product quality. Nevertheless, security requirements are of-
ten misunderstood and improperly specified due to lack of security expertise
and emphasis on security during early stages of software development [38].
While software requirements inspections represent a promising approach to
effectively verify security requirements, security expertise is essential, but of-
ten lacking in software engineers [12]. Hence, software engineers could benefit
from specific reading techniques to support the verification of security aspects
during requirements inspections.
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The picture is even more challenging in agile contexts. Most agile teams
do not have a security expert on board. Therefore Product Owners (POs)
and developers are, at best, responsible for identifying and prioritizing secu-
rity requirements [14]. However, POs as well as developers, often lack security
knowledge [52]. This may results in software which fails to properly deal with
security. According to Eberlein [19], there is a need for agile methods to in-
clude techniques that make it possible to identify NFRs early. There is also a
need to describe them in such a way that they may be analyzed early, thus
reducing the likelihood of costly rework [36]. Alsaqaf et al. [1] conducted a
literature review on engineering NFRs in agile projects that cover security
concerns. They reported 12 challenges such as the inability of user stories, the
most used artifact in agile RE, to document quality requirements, the prod-
uct owners lack of knowledge, the dependence on the product owner as the
single point to collect the requirements, and the delay in the validation of the
requirements. That is why several recent secondary studies acknowledge the
urgent need for methods to systematically engineer security requirements in
agile projects [1, 56]. In that direction, Villamizar et al. [56] identified that
most of the studies dealing with security in agile contexts, lack empirical eval-
uation and research on requirements verification. Such activities should be
conducted to assure those agile requirements specifications are correct, con-
sistent, unambiguous, and complete. This means appropriately covering basic
security-related aspects, such as input validation, unauthorized access, assign-
ment of administrative privileges and denial-of-service attacks.
Although these secondary studies have reported several challenges in liter-
ature, the number of solution proposals to address these concerns is limited.
Existing approaches (e.g., [12] [20] [43] [46]) employ inspection techniques to
verifying security or identify security goals from textual documents. These
proposals are not focused on agile, but this does not mean that they cannot
address these kinds of requirements. For instance, Carver et al. [12] propose
a perspective-based approach to identify security defects in general require-
ments. In this case, the authors do not explicitly mention considering their
approach in an agile context, but that does not exclude it to cover textual
requirements or agile specifications. To the best of our knowledge, only one
study explicitly proposes a methodology to address security verification ac-
tivities in agile software development [18]. The study proposes a lightweight
methodology to address NFRs early in agile software development processes.
Activities such as elicitation, reasoning and validation are considered within
the methodology in an effort to maintain agility while at the same time at-
tempting to improve the quality of software developed with agile processes.
Given the contemporary state of reported evidence, we took a step for-
ward to address the existing literature gap concerning security requirements
verification in agile contexts. We proposed and evaluated an approach for
reviewing security-related aspects in agile requirements specifications of web
applications, previously presented in [57]. We decided to focus on web applica-
tions given that they have become a target for accessing or extracting sensible
data. Results of our initial experimental evaluation, comparing our approach
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against using the complete list of OWASP high-level security requirements,
indicated that using our approach has a positive impact on the performance
of inspectors in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.
In this paper, we extend our previous study [57] in two ways: First, we pro-
vide further details on the approach and its initial evaluation, thus facilitating
its adoption. Second, we conducted a new experimental trial which compares
our approach with the perspective-based approach as reflected by Carver et
al.’s contribution [12]. The results of this new study strengthen our confidence
in improving effectiveness and efficiency when using our approach.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
background of agile RE and how security verification is typically performed in
this context. In this section, we also present related work. Section 3 presents
in detail the technique we chose to evaluate our proposed approach, in this
case, the perspective-based reading proposed by Carver et al. [12]. Section 4
introduces the approach we designed to deal with security verification in agile
contexts. Section 5 presents the study design used to evaluate the approach.
The results of the experimental trials are presented in Sections 6. We discussed
threats to validity and the results of the experiments in Section 7 and 8,
respectively. Section 8.5 provides a discussion of limitations of our approach.
Finally, our concluding remarks are presented in Section 9.
2 Background and Related Work
This section introduces the background on agile RE, inspections based on read-
ing techniques, security properties and requirements and the synergy between
these fields with verification activities. In addition, we describe related work
to our proposed approach.
2.1 Agile Requirements
The term “agile requirements” emerged in response to the agile manifesto.
It is used to define the “agile way” of executing and reasoning about RE
activities [31]. Yet, not much is known about the challenges posed by the col-
laboration oriented agile way of dealing with RE activities. Ramesh et al. [45]
performed a study with 16 organizations that develop software using agile
methods. They identified that agile RE practices resulted in challenges re-
garding neglected NFRs, minimum documentation and no requirements ver-
ifications. The recent report from the Naming the Pain in Requirements En-
gineering initiative [24] (NaPiRE) extends already known challenges with (i)
communication flaws between teams and customers, and (ii) under-specified
requirements that remain too abstract and, thus, are not measurable. These
observations give a picture on the difficulties of dealing with NFRs in agile
contexts. It is reasonable to believe that security requirements are no different
in this respect.
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2.2 Inspection Based on Reading Techniques
Software inspection is a quality assurance method to detect defects early dur-
ing the software development process. The aim is to guarantee that developers
deal with complete, consistent, unambiguous, and correct artifacts. In general,
several authors have worked on quality assurance methods for verifying the
quality properties of requirements. One of the most compared and evaluated
methods, in several experiments and studies, are defect detection techniques,
so-called reading techniques [28]. Software reading techniques attempt to in-
crease the effectiveness of individual reviewers by providing guidelines that
can be used to examine (by reading) a given software artifact and identify
defects [53]. There is empirical evidence that software reading is a promising
technique for increasing software quality for different situations and documents
types [49].
Perspective-based inspection is a variant of a formal technical review. This
type of inspection is based on explicitly defining the important stakeholders
for a particular artifact and the types of issues that are of importance to the
team. Rather than asking each reviewer to search for all types of problems,
the perspective-based approach requires inspectors to examine the document
using a role-based scenario based on how one specific stakeholder [12]. For
example, an inspection of system requirements may include an inspector using
a tester perspective. This inspector reviews the requirements by following a
scenario in which he/she considers how to generate test cases based on the
requirements.
Weak alignment of RE with inspection activities may lead to problems
in delivering the required products in time with the right quality [7]; for in-
stance, weak communication of requirements changes to testers may result in
lack of verification of new requirements and incorrect verification of old in-
valid requirements, leading to software quality problems, wasted effort and
delays [32].
2.3 Security Properties and Requirements
Security is an important quality characteristic of any software system that
manages valuable data and processes [3] [13] [17]. Hence, software development
should be conducted with security in mind at all stages and it should not be
an afterthought [36]. However, developing secure software is not a trivial task
often due to lack of awareness and security expertise in stakeholders and the
inadequacy of methodologies to support developers who are not security ex-
perts [29]. Typically, security is often dealt with in retrospective and retrofitted
when the system has already been designed and put into operation [38]. This
causes defects that have a major impact on the project resulting in a higher
cost to fix them.
Security properties are the targets the customer establishes for their secu-
rity program. Without security properties, they do not know what they are
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trying to accomplish for security and therefore will not reach any goals [43].
Security Requirements (SRs) engineering can provide a foundation for devel-
oping secure systems. Nevertheless, like other quality requirements, they tend
not to have simple yes/no satisfaction criteria. Haley et al. [27] present some
challenges related to SRs. First, people generally think about and express SRs
in terms of “bad things” (negative properties) to be prevented. It is difficult, if
not impossible, to measure negative properties. Second, for SRs, the tolerance
on “satisfied enough” is small, often zero, given the implications of noncom-
pliance. Moreover, stakeholders tend to want SRs satisfaction to be very close
to yes. Third, the effort stakeholders might be willing to dedicate to satis-
fying SRs also depends on the likelihood and impact of a failure to comply
with them. In recent years, SRs has been investigated by several researchers.
Mellado et al. [38] have conducted a systematic review of SRs approaches to
summarize existing methodologies. Fabian et al. [21] also provide a comparison
of SRs methods. Methods such as SQUARE [37] and Microsoft SDL [30] are
compared.
2.4 Related Work
Our related work was based on findings from literature reviews such as [1, 56]
and empirical searches in indexed databases. For instance, Alsaqaf et al. [1]
shows that very little is known about the evolution of NFRs (included se-
curity) in agile software development setting and more research is needed to
understand the contexts in which these approaches would fit and add value,
specially because very little empirical evaluation has been conducted. These
studies revealed an important number of published proposals addressing secu-
rity requirements in agile context. Most of them focused on analysing, identi-
fying and prioritizing these kind of requirements. On the other hand, we also
found studies focused on showing challenges and practitioners perspectives in
this context. However, few authors have addressed the specific problems of
security verification activities ( [12], [20], [43]). The picture is even poorer in
the agile context as concluded in [56]. We are aware of only one study that
explicitly states to address security verification activities in agile methods [18].
As far as security verifications are concerned, we include, as related work, some
studies that do not explicitly mention their suitability in agile contexts, but
given their domain application we consider them suitable to address the same
direction of our approach.
Domah et al. [18] propose a lightweight methodology to address NFRs
early in agile software development processes. NFRs elicitation, reasoning,
and validation are considered within that methodology. Regarding verification,
it depends on a quantification taxonomy with different levels of decomposi-
tion for identifying quantified validation criteria for each NFR. However, this
methodology does not offer specific guidance to support inspectors in identi-
fying security-related defects in requirements specifications. Hence, previous
knowledge on security is required to take advantage of the methodology.
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Riaz et al. [46] describes a tool-assisted process for identifying key at-
tributes of sentences to be used in security-related analysis and specification of
functional security requirements using a set of context-specific templates. The
tool takes natural language requirements artifacts (requirement specifications,
feature requests, etc.) and a trained classifier for the current problem domain
as input. It also parses the artifacts as text sentences and identifies which (if
any) security properties relate to each sentence. The tool then presents the
user with a list of applicable security requirements templates for the identi-
fied properties. We can say this work conceives security in the same way as
our approach. The difference is that they propose an approach for identifying
security requirements whereas our approach focuses on detecting defects from
security requirements already specified.
Elberzhager et al. [20] propose a model for security goals that involves
guided checklists to support inspectors when checking security. They describe
a step-by-step guide that results in questions to be checked by an inspector.
This model is similar to our proposal because it works using a reading tech-
nique that supports the inspector on how to review security. However, there
are differences. First, our approach focuses on verifying SRs in early stages,
i.e., right after requirements specification and within agile requirement arti-
facts. Second, our approach addresses high-level SRs as defined by the Open
Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [42], which provides a well-known
industry standard on security. Furthermore, our proposal involves classifying
the defects found by inspectors, providing a better understanding of the dis-
tribution of the problems.
Peine et al. [43] propose a model named Security Goal Indicator Tree
(SGIT) that maps negative and non-local goals to positive, concrete features
of the software that can be checked during an inspection. The model supports
inspection of software documents from various phases of the development pro-
cess. An SGIT links a security goal with numerous indicators (which may be
beneficial or detrimental for the achievement of the goal) and structures the
set of indicators by Boolean and conditional relationships enabling an efficient
selection of indicator subsets. Despite the deep analysis provided by this work,
it is not clear the level of expertise needed by inspectors to use the model. Fur-
thermore, as the related work above, the model does not shed light on the type
of defects detected.
Carver et al. [12] focus their proposal on a PBR technique with the aim of
identifying security defects. They describe a set of perspectives that provide
security-specific questions for a requirements inspection. Two of them are part
of the PBR technique (designer and tester). They also created a new perspec-
tive based on the needs of a black hat tester. In this additional perspective,
the reviewer focuses on three types of security information: cryptography, au-
thentication, and data validation. According to the authors, those types of
information and the related questions were adapted for requirements from
Araujo and Curpheys article on security code reviews [2]. However, due to
the large number of software vulnerabilities and the variety of ways to deploy
computer attacks, it could not be enough to consider only three types of secu-
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rity controls. Indeed, the list is incomplete when compared to other security
standards such as OWASP [42] or the Common Criteria [39].
To summarize, only few approaches exist that address the systematic de-
tection of security defects, especially during early stages, and the number
decreases when considering agile contexts which redraws the picture of how
security could and should be dealt with [56]. However, we consider this last
work, proposed by Carver et al. [12], the most related work given its nature
to detect defects early via a reading technique and its focus on security. For
that reason, we decided using this work to compare it against our approach
with the aim of evaluating the suitability with respect to others proposals. In
the following section, we present in detail the work proposed by Carver et al.
3 Perspective-Based Reading Black Hat Approach
One of the objectives of Carver et al.’s work is to integrate practices from
the security engineering and software engineering communities into a set of
techniques for identifying and removing security vulnerabilities early in the
software lifecycle. This work is an adaptation of the PBR technique to address
the security vulnerability problem during a requirements inspection process.
The authors tailored PBR to focus on software security by augmenting two of
the standard PBR perspectives (the designer and the tester) with additional
security specific questions. In addition, the authors proposed a new perspective
based on the needs of a black hat tester. Using this approach, the inspector
reviews the requirements by following a scenario in which he/she considers
how to generate test cases based on the requirements.
3.0.1 Set of Perspectives for Requirements Inspection
The designer perspective has the goal of ensuring that there is enough, con-
sistent information present in the requirements to successfully create a sys-
tem design. The existing scenario is augmented with questions that focus on
whether important security-related information has been correctly specified
rather than being left up to the designer, who may not be familiar with all
details of the security policy. This perspective provides a set of questions that
the reviewer should consider when following this perspective:
– Have the requirements specified enough information about the security
policies for the designer to understand whether a layered security policy is
required instead of a single point of vulnerability?
– If several administrator roles are defined, have they been defined as separate
accounts with limited access to security resources, or a single account with
comprehensive super user permissions?
On the other hand, the scenario for the tester perspective remains un-
changed, but is augmented with security specific questions. The inspector us-
ing the tester perspective has the goal of ensuring that the trustworthiness of
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the system will be knowable during the testing phase. The questions of this
perspective should consider the following:
– Have the requirements specified appropriate exception-handling function-
ality?
– Have the requirements specified adequate safeguards that would take effect
once a malicious user has gained unauthorized access to the system?
– Does the system have a well-defined status, either a secure failure state or
the start of a plausible recovery procedure, after a failure condition?
As a new perspective proposed by the authors, the black hat perspective
focuses the reviewer on finding weaknesses in the requirements that could be
exploited via an attack. The scenario that the reviewer follows is to create a
set of malicious attack scenarios that seek to exploit system vulnerabilities.
3.0.2 Types of Security Properties
While creating the black hat scenario, the reviewer focuses on three types
of security properties at the requirements stage: Cryptography, Authentica-
tion/Authorization, and Data Validation. These types of properties, along
with the related questions were adapted for requirements from Araujo and
Curpheys article on Security Code Reviews [2].
Cryptography relates to the encoding mechanisms specified for data
items within the system. During the review, the inspector is looking for under-
specified or incorrectly specified features that could be exploited. The questions
include the following:
– Can the encoding mechanism specified for transmission and storage of data
be broken?
– Do the cryptography mechanism specified follow well-known, well-document-
ed, and publicly scrutinized algorithms, and if not, can they be easily bro-
ken?
Authentication/Authorization focuses the reviewer on on determining
how unauthorized users could gain access to the system. The questions include
the following:
– Can the protocols for validating user identity be broken?
– If account lockout is specified, are there requirements in place to prevent
denial-of-service attacks?
– Can user privileges be artificially elevated due to omission or poorly spec-
ified requirements?
Lastly, Data Validation is an important source of security vulnerabilities
and focuses the reviewer on determining whether invalid data could be entered
into the system. The question is: Do the requirements leave any opportunities
for invalid data to be entered by the lack of validation of external data?
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4 Our Approach
In this section, we present our approach for reviewing security-related as-
pects in agile requirements specifications of web applications. The approach
was designed considering user stories and their security specifications as in-
put and involves applying Natural Language Processing (NLP). The goal is
to relate those user stories to candidate security properties and high-level se-
curity requirements proposed by the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP), a well known online community that produces freely-available ar-
ticles, methodologies, documentation, tools, and technologies in the field of
web application security [42]. As a result, the approach provides a user story
focused reading technique that can be used to support the manual inspection
of agile requirements. The reading technique helps to verify the user story
security specifications against the OWASP high-level security requirements
to identify defects such as omissions, ambiguities, inconsistencies, or incor-
rect facts. In the following, we provide more details of the conception of the
approach.
4.1 Assumptions
The approach was designed with some underlying assumptions in mind. These
assumptions are as follows.
Requirements are specified in a user story format. The software industry
has gradually increased the use of agile and hybrid methods in its projects [33].
In this context, user story is the most frequently used artifact for require-
ments specification [48]. Therefore, the approach is focused on agile and, more
specifically, on user stories. The stories are often analyzed independently and
structured in a sentence as follows: As a [role], I want to [feature], so that
[reason].
The OWASP represents a reliable baseline and standard of security guide-
lines. OWASP has a strong focus on web applications, one of the targets of our
approach. OWASP concerns providing practical information about security in
web applications to individuals, corporations, universities, government agen-
cies, and other organizations worldwide. Many open source security-related
tools (e.g., SonarQube 1) and current research (e.g., [51]) on web application
security use OWASP as a definitive reference. Hence, we consider the reliability
of this project as a reasonable assumption.
4.2 Approach Scope Delimitation
Hereafter, we answer some potential questions to provide further understand-
ing of the intended approach.
1 https://docs.sonarqube.org/latest/user-guide/security-rules/
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To whom is the approach intended? Our approach was designed to support
novice inspectors and junior security analysts. This work provides them with
a reading technique to assist in the identification of defects related to security
aspects in agile requirements specifications. According to Nerur [40], people
with a high-level of competence are of vital importance in agile teams because
they tend not to depend on documentation to fulfill their functions. Much of
the knowledge in agile development is tacit and resides in the heads of the de-
velopment team members [8]. Even more challenging, competence in software
security is typically not widely spread among agile practitioners [26]. Given
this, it is helpful to guide novice inspectors, including junior security analysts,
by providing a detailed reading technique to support them. We believe that
senior security analysts could still use the approach, but they are outside of
the scope of our evaluation.
What security-related aspects does the approach cover? We decided to fo-
cus on security properties and high-level SRs as proposed by the OWASP [42].
These high-level SRs describe the most important security features that archi-
tects and developers should include in every web application [42]. The System
and Software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) model [59] also
define security characteristics, which hereafter, for term compatibility, will also
be referred to as security properties. OWASP contains three security proper-
ties: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. SQuaRE, in contrast, contains
five: confidentiality, accountability, integrity, non-repudiation, and authenti-
cation. Based on their definitions, all of the SQuaRE security properties can
be mapped onto the OWASP security properties. For our final list of consid-
ered security properties, we used the OWASP properties with a single change,
splitting confidentiality into two separate properties: (i) confidentiality and
(ii) identification and authentication. Table 1 presents the security properties
considered by our approach.
Table 1 Security properties considered by our approach
Security Property Description
Confidentiality (C) Degree to which the data is disclosed only as intended.
Integrity (I) Degree to which a system or component prevents unauthorized
access to, or modification of, computer programs or data.
Availability (A) Degree to which a system or component is operational when
required for use.
Identification
Authorization (IA)
Degree to which the identity of a subject or resource can be
proved to be the one claimed.
What types of requirements defects does the approach cover? In RE, a defect
can be defined as any problem of correctness and completeness with respect to
the requirements, internal consistency, or other quality attributes [53]. A com-
mon defect taxonomy used when inspecting requirements is the one proposed
by Shull [49]. The defect types in this taxonomy are: omission, ambiguity, in-
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consistent information, incorrect fact, and extraneous information. However,
we excluded the extraneous information defect type (which concerns specifying
requirements that are not needed). This decision was taken because we use the
OWASP high-level SRs as a reference; while they are stated as mandatory for
inclusion, they are not necessarily complete, given that specific security needs
may sprout for specific applications. Hence, given the impact that a missing
security requirement can have on the application, we did not feel comfort-
able to recommend exclusions. Table 2 shows the defect types covered by our
approach, their definitions and examples applied to security.
Table 2 Defect types definition and examples in scope of our approach
Defect Type Definition Applied to Security
Omission (O) Necessary information about
the system has been omitted
from the software artifact.
One or more security require-
ments that are not covered
by the specifications originally
created by an agile team.
Ambiguity (A) A requirement has multiple in-
terpretations due to multiple
terms for the same character-
istic.
For example, “the system shall
inactivate a session when it ex-
ceeds certain periods of inac-
tivity” is ambiguous because it
is not clear the amount of time
necessary to inactivate the ses-
sion. It could be seconds, min-
utes or hours.
Inconsistency (IS) Two or more requirements are
in conflict.
One security requirement spec-
ifies to encrypt data with
RSA algorithm but another
one specifies to encrypt it with
AES.
Incorrect Fact (IF) A requirement asserts a fact
that cannot be true under the
conditions specified for the sys-
tem.
For example, “the system shall
protect the firewall” does not
make sense because it is the
firewall that protects the sys-
tem.
What kind of review technique does the approach use? Typically, developers
and software analysts rely on ad-hoc methods or checklists to analyze docu-
ments. In an ad-hoc review, the reader is not given directions on how to read.
The result is that reviewers tend to build up skills in document understanding
slowly based on individual experiences acquired over time [4]. For this rea-
son, we decided to focus the review of our approach on a reading technique
to increase the effectiveness of individual reviewers by providing a systematic
guide that can be used to examine, in our case, security-related aspects and
consequently to identify defects.
To which part of the lifecycle of agile methods can the approach be applied?
Agile methods are characterized by having iterative structures that should
allow early delivery, continual improvement, and rapid and flexible response
to change [6]. Hence, we envision that our approach is used just before a user
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story is defined as ready for codifying. In this way, we avoid rework that can
be caused by not considering a security control or integrating one requirement
with another one.
4.3 Overview of our Approach
We propose our approach in two defined phases: (1) generating artifacts for
the reading technique based on the agile requirements specification, and (2)
following the reading technique to identify defects. Figure 1 shows the flow
and relationships between the artifacts and phases that form our approach.
Fig. 1 Overall structure of our approach
4.3.1 Phase 1: Generating Artifacts for the Reading Technique
To generate the artifacts to follow our reading technique, we use Natural Lan-
guage Processing (NLP) to extract keywords from the user story. Thereafter,
these words are used to identify security properties and to link the related
OWASP high-level SRs to be verified. The availability of automatic tools for
the quality analysis of natural language requirements is recognized as a key
factor for achieving software quality [34]. Details on how keywords and security
properties are identified follow.
Extracting keywords. This activity involves automatically analyzing a
user story that describes the features and functional requirements of the soft-
ware to be built. Our approach extracts the relevant verb (action) of the user
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story that indicates a potential behavior to consider when thinking about se-
curity. For instance, the verb “export” could indicate confidentiality concerns
because it is an action about transporting something. On the other hand, the
verb “modify” could indicate integrity concerns because it is an action that
involves altering something. In some cases, the nouns of the user story can
also indicate situations where certain security features should be considered.
This is particularly important to identify availability needs, e.g., time values
(day, hour, second, period) may indicate scale/performance restrictions of the
software. In that sense, nouns are also extracted for matching purposes. In
summary, the verb is extracted from the second block of the user story format
and nouns are extracted from the third block. Table 3 shows where the words
come from.
Table 3 Way to extract the keywords from the user story
Type of Word User Story Skeleton
Verbs As a [user], I [want to], [so that].
Nouns As a [user], I [want to], [so that].
To extract the words, we developed a Software Framework (FESRAS),2
which uses the Stanford CoreNLP tool3 through a library that provides a set
of natural language analysis tools written in Java. The library represents each
sentence as a directed graph where the vertices are words and the edges are
the relationships between them. Thereby, the software framework can take the
verbs and nouns of the user story. Figure 2 shows how the Stanford CoreNLP
tool represents the user story to identify verbs, nouns, among other kind of
words. For this, consider the sentence: The system shall terminate a remote
session after 30 minutes of inactivity.
Fig. 2 Sentence representation [50]
2 https://github.com/hrguarinv/FESRAS
3 https://github.com/stanfordnlp/CoreNLP
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Note that the words extracted by using the Stanford Core NLP are not
always keywords. After extracting the verb and nouns, we need to determine
if these words match any keyword of our repository. If so, the user story con-
tains at least one keyword that indicates some security concern that should
be addressed. This matching is explained below.
Identifying Security Properties and Linking High-Level SRs. After
identifying the keywords of the user story, we need to identify security prop-
erties in order to map high-level SRs that represent a set of security-specific
features to be verified. We use the keywords extracted from the user story to
map security properties. Our software framework contains a set of keywords
that are related to at least one security. Table 4 shows some these keywords
that are part of our repository, to indicate which security properties should be
considered. As an example, observe that the keyword “access”, that is a verb,
indicates security concerns related to confidentiality, Identification and Autho-
rization, because when accessing data, controls must be in place to guarantee
the correct disclosure to it. Our online material, available at Zenodo4, contains
all the keywords of the repository.
Table 4 Relationship between the keywords and security properties
Keyword Confidentiality Integrity Availability IA
Access X X
Alter X
Apply X
Auto-populate X
Change X
Create X
Define X
Delete X
Display X
Establish X
Export X
Generate X
Modify X
Read X X
Recover X
Backup X
Day X
Hour X
Password X
Period X
Privilege X
Role X
Time X
This repository is based on a similar one provided by Slankas and Williams [50]
in their work about automated extraction of NFRs in available documentation.
4 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3966542
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However, we complement it by (1) considering additional keywords stated by
the OWASP and (2) including synonyms of the words from these sources. By
doing this, we increase the coverage of our repository. If there is no match be-
tween the words extracted and the keywords of our repository that indicates
security properties, our approach will link the user story with their security
specifications to all the security properties stored in our repository. With this
the inspection will not be as advantageous in terms of effort and time as we
anticipated because the reviewer will have to evaluate each of the security
properties. However, in this way we ensure that the user story is examined by
the four main domains of security in web applications.
After identifying the security property, we need to link the high-level SRs,
which according to OWASP, are basic to deal with security in web applications.
Table 5 shows the OWASP high-level SRs by security property.
Table 5 OWASP high-level security requirements by security property
Security Property OWASP High-Level Security Requirements
Confidentiality C1. Data shall be protected from unauthorized observation
and disclosure both in transit and when stored.
C2. System sessions shall be unique to each individual and
cannot be shared.
C3. System sessions are invalidated when timed out during
periods of inactivity.
C4. TLS protocol shall be used where sensitive data is trans-
mitted.
C5. System shall use strong encryption algorithm at all times.
Integrity I1. Any unauthorized modification of data must yield an au-
ditable security-related event.
I2. All input is validated to be correct and fit for the intended
purpose.
I3. Data from an external entity shall always be validated.
Availability A1. The application server shall be suitably hardened from a
default configuration.
A2. HTTP responses contain a safe character set in the content
type header.
A3. Backups must be implemented and recovery strategies
must be considered.
Identification &
Authorization
IA1. Users are associated with a well-defined set of roles and
privileges.
IA2. The digital identity of the sender of a communication
must be verified.
IA3. Only those authorized are able to authenticate and cre-
dentials are transported and stored in a secure manner.
IA4. Passwords treatment must include complex passphrases,
options to recover and reset the password and default pass-
words not allowed.
At this point of our approach, we already identified the keywords of the user
story, the security properties related to those keywords and consequently, the
OWASP high-level SRs that address those security properties. The next step is
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to build the defect reporting form that works as a model and synthesizes most
of the information the inspector needs to identify defects in the specifications.
This form presents, in a structured way, much of the information that the
reviewer must analyze to identify and classify the defects. Information such
as the user story, the security property, the OWASP high-level SRs and the
defect types are provided by the form. Figure 3 shows a template of this form
with two of the security properties covered by our approach.
Fig. 3 Defect reporting form
With the defect reporting form ready to be used the inspectors can use
it as a model to verify whether the security specifications built, in a realis-
tic example, by requirements or security analysts, contains any of the defect
types covered in this work. This happens when inspectors compare the security
specifications against the OWASP high-level SRs presented in the reporting
form. To reach this, our approach formulates a set of verification questions to
help identifying the different defect types in the security specifications. Table 6
shows the questions.
Table 6 Verification questions for the different defect types
Type of Defect Question
Omission When comparing the security specifications with the OWASP
high-level SRs, are there high-level SRs or characteristics that
were not specified?
Ambiguity Does any security specification allow for multiple interpretations?
Inconsistency Are there two or more security specifications in conflict?
Incorrect Fact Is there any security specification stating information that is not
true under the conditions specified?
The first question aims to identify omission defects. For this type of defect,
we provide to inspectors our rewritten OWASP high-level SRs that work as a
model. With this, we seek to identify which SRs, stated by OWASP as basic
and essential, are missing in the security requirements that were specified in
agile software projects. Note that in the worst case, few or no security re-
quirements are specified, as typically occurs in this type of projects. Thus, by
doing this comparison we can offer relevant insights to inspectors to identify
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this type of defect. To identify the remaining defects, we use their definitions
in a clear and short way. Our intention is to provide agile support to increase
the efficiency of the inspection task. We believe that inspectors can directly
associate the concept of the defect with the actions that allow them to identify
such defects. For instance, to detect ambiguity defects our reading technique
asks the inspector if any security specification allows for multiple interpreta-
tions. Regarding inconsistency defects, the inspectors must focus on figuring
out whether two or more security specifications are in conflict. In this way,
the meaning of the defect seeks to guide the inspector on the detection of
ambiguity, inconsistency and incorrect fact defects.
4.3.2 Phase 2: Following the Reading Technique
This phase aims to guide the reviewer in finding the requirements defects.
Using the artifacts generated in Phase 1, we propose a reading technique that
inspectors can follow to answer the verification questions in order to look
for defects. As presented in Section 2.2, software reading techniques help a
reviewer to “read” a requirement artifact for the purpose of finding relevant
information that gives specific and practical guidance for identifying, in this
case, security-related defects in agile requirements specifications.
To facilitate the review, our approach rewrites the OWASP high-level SRs
in such a way that inspectors can easily identify certain security aspects. For
instance, we use the “AND” logical connector in capital letters to get the at-
tention of the reader and indicate that both aspects must be considered to
satisfy the high-level SR, e.g., we have the following to the first confidentiality
high-level SR: C1. Data shall be protected from unauthorized observation or
disclosure both in transit AND when stored. In this case, if the specifications
were well specified, they must consider security aspects related to data pro-
tection both in transit and in storage. Otherwise, there is an omission defect.
Fig. 4 Visual aspect of the rewritten OWASP high-level SRs
On the other hand, the security statements provided by our reading tech-
nique also present examples for some concepts in order to give inspectors an
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idea about the context of the OWASP high-level SRs. An example to the sec-
ond integrity high-level SR follows: I2. All input, e.g., query parameters, string
variables and cookies, is validated to be correct and fit for the intended pur-
pose. In this way, reviewers are provided with a reading technique that should
increase their performance during the review. Figure 4 shows an example of
how the OWASP high-level SRs looks to get the attention of inspectors.
To summarize how inspectors should use our approach, we present Figure 5
that provides a step-by-step of the activities to be followed by inspectors.
The process begins by reading and analyzing the user story and their security
specifications (input of our approach) to compare them with the OWASP high-
level SRs. After this, inspectors can read our security verification questions for
each defect type with the aim of detecting them and then report them (output
of our approach). Please note that the process is repeated for each user story
with their respective security specifications. We clarify that if there are no
related security specifications as input in our approach, the result will be all
of the OWASP high-level SRs related to the security property matched by the
words extracted from the user story.
Fig. 5 Procedures to apply to each user story
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4.4 Motivational Example
In the following, we demonstrate the application of our approach in an exam-
ple setting. For this purpose, we present one of the agile specifications used in
the experiments. Table 7 shows a user story and its set of security specifica-
tions (inputs of our approach) with some defects commonly applied to a web
application.
Table 7 Input of the approach as agile requirements specification
User Story Security Specification (SS)
As a customer, I want to be
able to export my personal
information so that I can use
it in other systems.
SS1. The system shall ensure that there is no residual
data exposed.
SS2. The system shall store credentials securely using
the AES encryption algorithm.
SS3. The system shall use the RSA encryption algo-
rithm to protect all data all the time.
SS4. The system shall deactivate a session when it ex-
ceeds certain periods of inactivity.
SS5. The system shall encrypt the roles and privileges
of the system.
With the user story in sight, the software framework extracts the words of
the second and third block of the user story by using the Stanford CoreNLP,
and then evaluates whether there is match to link the security properties.
In this case, the extracted words are “export” (from the second block) and
“system” (from third block). The following illustrates which keywords are
extracted from the user story.
As a customer, I want to be able to export my personal information so
that I can use it in other systems.
Thereafter, the framework can verify whether some security property is
related to the extracted words. According to Table 4, “export” matches con-
fidentiality, while “system” does not match any of the security properties.
Figure 6 presents the relationship between the keyword and the security prop-
erty.
In this way, since our approach identified confidentiality as security prop-
erty, it can propose OWASP high-level SRs (Cf. Table 5, confidentiality). As
part of our approach, we rewrite those OWASP high-level SRs to improve its
readability and understanding. For that reason, the OWASP high-level SRs
are provided to inspectors in the following way.
– C1. Data shall be protected from unauthorized observation and disclosure
both in transit AND when stored.
– C2. System sessions shall be unique to each individual AND cannot be
shared.
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– C3. System sessions are invalidated when timed out during periods of in-
activity.
– C4. TLS protocol shall be used where sensitive data is transmitted.
– C5. System shall use strong algorithms (e.g, DES, AES, RSA) to encrypt
data.
Fig. 6 Matching keywords to security properties
These OWASP high-level SRs are the basis to determine if the security
specifications presented in Table 7 contains omission defects. Note that in-
spectors are encouraged to read our verification questions to further analyze
the quality of the specifications.
Our approach then generates the defect reporting form by showing the
user story with the linked security properties and OWASP high-level SRs.
The verification questions are also provided here. Thus, inspectors know which
security aspects they should verify. In that sense, the verification process starts
at this point. By having inspectors responding to the verification questions
looking for defects, we expect to obtain valuable insights from them on the
quality of the security specifications. A sample enactment of answering these
questions follows.
When comparing the security specifications with the OWASP high-level
SRs, are there high-level SRs or characteristics that were not specified? In
this case, 3 out of 5 confidentiality high-level security requirements linked in
Table 5 are related or make sense to the security specifications. However, we
have two unspecified high-level requirements. Note that the second confiden-
tiality high-level SR (C2) and the fourth confidentiality high-level SR (C4)
are not covered by the security specifications. Therefore, we have detected two
defects that should be marked as “omission”.
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Does any security specification allow for multiple interpretations? If we an-
alyze with caution, we see that the fourth security specification (SS4) reflects
a weak statement as the amount of time concerning “certain periods of inac-
tivity”. It could be hours or seconds. Thus, we have identified a defect related
to ambiguity.
Are there two or more security specifications in conflict? The answer is
affirmative. The second security specification (SS2) and third security specifi-
cation (SS3) conflict because SS3 indicates to encrypt all data using the RSA
algorithm. Nevertheless, SS2 indicates to protect credentials, which are also
data, using the AES algorithm. Thus, we have identified a defect related to
inconsistency.
Is there any security specification stating a characteristic that cannot be
true under the conditions specified for the system? The fifth security speci-
fication (SS5) is not correct because the concepts of the system cannot be
encrypted. The action “encrypt” is not correct in the statement.
Table 8 Defects reporting form
User Story Security Property OWASP High-Level SRs O A IS IF
US1
Confidentiality
C1. Data shall be pro-
tected from unauthorized
observation AND disclo-
sure both in transit AND
when stored.
SS4
SS2
SS3
SS5
C2. System sessions shall
be unique to each individ-
ual AND cannot be shared.
X
C3. System sessions are in-
validated when timed out
during periods of inactiv-
ity.
C4. TLS protocol shall be
used where sensitive data is
transmitted.
X
C5. System shall use strong
algorithms (e.g, DES, AES,
RSA) to encrypt data.
Finally, the reviewers fill out the defect reporting form that summarizes
the defects found. Table 8 presents the output of the review using the reading
technique. Note that the O column is related to the OWASP high-level SRs
that were omitted to satisfy the Security Property (SP). The other columns
are related to the remaining defect types.
In summary, this table indicates that the security specifications related to
the user story contain six defects. Two out of them were marked as omission
because the second and fourth OWASP high-level SRs related to confidential-
ity (C2, C4) are not covered by the security specifications. The rest of the
defects (4) are related to ambiguous, inconsistent and incorrect fact defects.
In this case, the fourth security specification (SS4) was marked as ambiguous,
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the second security specification (SS2) and the third security specification
(SS3) were marked as inconsistent and the fifth security specification (SS5)
was marked as incorrect.
5 Experiment
We evaluated the approach by conducting three controlled experiment trials
with eight graduate and 48 undergraduate computer science students of the
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. The focus was to observe the
impact of using our approach on effectiveness, efficiency, usefulness and ease
of use.
We evaluated the study in two phases. In the first, we wanted to know
whether our approach was suitable under certain non-complex conditions.
With some positive results, the second phase was planned. In this case, the
goal was to obtain more empirical evidence and then determine whether our
approach is technically promising to use it in more complex environments.
Thus, we conducted a new study by analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency
of our approach when compared with the PBR Black Hat approach proposed
by Carver et al. [12]. This decision was supported due to that approach uses the
same type of inspection technique that our approach and therefore is totally
aimed at identifying security-related defects.
The motivation for conducting the new study is to examine whether the
findings can be replicated in different levels of support (e.g., using the PBR
Black Hat approach), incorporating lessons learned from the first evaluation.
We considered guidelines for reporting additional experimental studies pro-
posed in [11].
In this section, we detail the design of the experiments conducted to evalu-
ate our approach. We present the goal, hypotheses, variable selection, selection
of subjects, instrumentation, among others. We break down the experiments
in three trials with different characteristics. In the original study, we allocated
undergraduate and graduate students of Computer Science that were divided
into two trial experiments. Regarding the new study (third trial), we assigned
undergraduate students. Table 9 present some relevant details of the trials
conducted across the study.
Table 9 Controlled experiment trials conducted across the study
Study Trial Date Undergraduate Graduate Total
Original 1 March, 2019 25 0 25
2 March, 2019 0 8 8
New 3 November, 2019 23 0 23
In the following, we present similarities and differences between the origi-
nal and the new study. In all the studies, subjects were assigned to the task of
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identifying security-related defects based on a set of agile requirements speci-
fications.
5.1 Goal, Hypotheses and Research Questions
For all the experiments (original and new study), we wanted to determine
whether the use of our approach leads to efficient and effective detection of
security-related defects when compared to an ad-hoc inspection based on per-
sonal expertise and the PBR Black Hat approach. Table 10 details the defini-
tion of this study’s goal by following the template provided by Basili [5].
Table 10 Goal definition of the experiments
Analyze the reading technique generated by our approach
for the purpose of characterization
with respect to the effectiveness, efficiency, usefulness and ease of use of the approach
from the point of
view of
researchers (on the measured effectiveness and efficiency) and in-
spectors (on the perceived usefulness and ease of use)
in the context of novice inspectors using our approach, when compared to using the
OWASP high-level SRs and the PBR Black Hat approach.
Based on our goal, we formulated Research Questions (RQs) that seek to
address two aspects that we believe should be covered by our approach. First,
efficiency and effectiveness play an important role in inspection activities, as
inspectors should be able to find defects (effectiveness) with reasonable effort
(efficiency). Second, we also address usefulness concerns, because they are
closely related to the adoption of the approach. Therefore, we defined the
following two RQs that apply to both the studies conducted.
– (RQ1) Does our approach have an effect on defect detection effectiveness
and efficiency when compared to the other review approaches of the study?
– (RQ2) How do the inspectors perceive the usefulness and ease of use of
our approach?
Based on RQ1, we derived hypotheses to be evaluated quantitatively. Note
that we defined hypotheses that vary depending on the study performed and
that they may refuted or supported only in comparison with the considered
other methods. In the original study, the following hypotheses were derived:
– H01a: There is no difference in terms of effectiveness when using our ap-
proach, when compared to using the OWASP high-level SRs.
– H11a: There is a difference in terms of effectiveness when using our ap-
proach, when compared to using the OWASP high-level SRs.
– H02a: There is no difference in terms of efficiency when using our approach,
when compared to using the OWASP high-level SRs.
– H12a: There is a difference in terms of efficiency when using our approach,
when compared to using the OWASP high-level SRs.
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Regarding the new study, we compare the performance of using our ap-
proach against the PBR Black Hat approach. Thus, we defined the following
hypotheses.
– H01b:There is no difference in terms of effectiveness when using our ap-
proach, when compared to using the PBR Black Hat approach.
– H11b: There is a difference in terms of effectiveness when using our ap-
proach, when compared to using the PBR Black Hat approach.
– H02b: There is no difference in terms of efficiency when using our approach,
when compared to using the PBR Black Hat approach.
– H12b: There is a difference in terms of efficiency when using our approach,
when compared to using the PBR Black Hat approach.
5.2 Variables Selection
The independent variable is the treatment applied by the groups to detect
defects in the SRs specifications. In that sense, inspectors who were part of the
control group in the first and second trial received as support the OWASP high-
level SRs. On the other hand, in the third trial, inspectors who were part of
the control group received the PBR Black Hat approach, but at the same time,
they received the same support that inspectors in the first and second trial,
that is, they also received the OWASP high-level security requirements. With
respect to the experimental group, all the inspectors received our approach.
Table 11 Metrics used to answer the RQs and test the hypotheses
Criteria Type Description
Effectiveness Quantitative Ratio between the number of defects found and the
total of seeded defects in the specifications
Efficiency Quantitative Ratio between the number of real defects found and
the time spent in finding them
Usefulness Quantitative Frequency of the participants’ perception on the use-
fulness of the approach using a follow-up questionnaire
Qualitative Coding of the answers of the follow-up questionnaire
Ease of use Quantitative Frequency of the participants’ perception on the ease
of use of the approach using a follow-up questionnaire
Qualitative Coding of the answers of the follow-up questionnaire
Regarding the dependent variables, we used effectiveness and efficiency,
defined as follows. Effectiveness is expressed as the ratio between the number
of real defects found and the total of seeded defects in the documents. On the
other hand, Efficiency refers to the ratio between the number of real defects
found and the time spent in finding them. For these variables, we collected
quantitative data to test the hypotheses presented in Section 5.1. We also
collected qualitative data with open questions via a follow-up questionnaire.
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The aim was to gain insights about the perceived usefulness and ease of use of
the approach. Table 11 summarizes the metrics collected in the experiments.
5.3 Selection of Subjects
Our subjects were intended to represent novice inspectors. We thus selected
subjects, by convenience, from classes on computer science at PUC-Rio, in-
volving, for the original study, 25 undergraduate (first trial) and eight grad-
uate students (second trial). Regarding the new study, the experiment was
conducted in one trial (third trial), involving 23 undergraduate students from
classes on computer science at PUC-Rio. There is evidence that using students
is an effective way to advance software engineering theories and technologies
but, like any other aspect of study settings, should be carefully considered dur-
ing the design, execution, interpretation, and reporting of an experiment [22].
We characterized the subjects by their experience and knowledge in five
areas: agile software development (ASD), agile RE (ARE), security aspects
(SA), security requirements (SR) and requirements inspections (RI). To this
end, we defined a scale from one to five where lower score indicates lower
experience and high score indicates experience in the industry.
Table 12 shows details of the characterization of the students of the original
study. Subjects with at least three values greater to three were highlighted
to identify the participants were equally divided between the groups of the
experiments, applying the blocking principle. We did not list subjects of the
new study because none of them met the requirements to be treated differently.
Therefore, they were randomly assigned into control and experimental groups.
As a result, we found that the majority of students had a low level of secu-
rity and requirements inspection experience. Hence, they match our intended
profile (novice inspectors).
5.4 Experiment Context
In the following, we detail the experiment context of the studies. Before con-
ducting the controlled experiment of the first trial, we carried out a pilot study
with two independent volunteers. The aim was to evaluate the overall (partic-
ularly technical) feasibility, time, adverse events, and improve the experiment
materials before the experiment trials.
All the studies were conducted with the same agile specifications. These
requirements contain a set of user stories in this format: As a [Role], I want
[Feature], so that [Reason]. The document also contained their related security
specifications with seeded defects that represent specifications that in real
settings, would be created by requirements analysts or product owners in agile
teams. (cf. Section 4.4 to see one of the specifications used in the experiments).
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Table 12 Details of the characterization of the subjects
Experiment Level ID Trial ASD ARE SA SR RI
Original Undergraduate 1 1 3 3 1 1 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 2
3 1 4 4 4 4 2
4 1 4 1 4 3 4
5 1 5 2 4 4 2
6 1 2 2 2 1 2
7 1 2 2 3 3 3
8 1 2 2 2 1 1
9 1 3 2 1 1 2
10 1 5 2 2 1 2
11 1 2 1 2 2 1
12 1 3 2 1 2 2
13 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 1 2 5 3 3 1
15 1 2 2 2 2 2
16 1 5 5 2 1 3
17 1 3 1 1 1 1
18 1 3 1 3 2 2
19 1 4 1 1 2 2
20 1 5 5 2 2 1
21 1 4 4 1 1 1
22 1 5 5 2 2 4
23 1 2 3 2 2 2
24 1 4 4 1 1 1
25 1 2 2 3 2 1
Graduate 26 2 3 2 3 3 1
27 2 2 2 3 3 1
28 2 4 2 4 4 2
29 2 4 2 1 1 1
30 2 4 1 2 2 2
31 2 4 3 4 4 5
32 2 2 2 2 3 3
33 2 2 2 2 2 2
Aiming at mitigating threats to validity concerning the distribution of sub-
jects between groups, we characterized the subjects and then applied the prin-
ciples of balancing, blocking and random assignment [58]. In all the trials, stu-
dents who demonstrated experience on the topics involved in the study were
separated and distributed equally into the control and experimental group.
In the case of the first and second trials, we allocated equally 6 out of 33
between the groups, given they had higher scores. Regarding the new study,
subjects were randomly placed into the experimental and control group since
the characterization did not shed light. Table 13 shows the support given to
the control and experimental group in each trial.
In Table 14, we present the number of undergraduate students (US) and
graduate students (GS) in each group of the trials.
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Subjects who found less than two defects were discarded as outliers be-
cause, in our understanding, their results reflect a lack of interest in having
a good performance in the review. In the original study, we discarded two
subjects from the first trial and one for the second trial. All these discarded
subjects conducted the inspection by using the OWASP high-level SRs (con-
trol group). Regarding the new study, we discarded one subject from the third
trial. In this case, the discarded subject conducted the inspection by using our
approach (experimental group).
Table 13 Support provided to each group of the experiments
Trial Control Group Experimental Group
1, 2 OWASP high-level SRs Our approach
3 PBR Black Hat + OWASP high-level SRs Our approach
Table 14 Number of subjects by experiment, trial and group
Experiment Trial Control Experimental Total
Original 1 12 US 13 US 25
2 4 GS 4GS 8
New 3 11 US 12 US 23
To avoid the defect seeding to represent a confounding factor, the type
and amount of seeded defects to evaluate the suitability of our approach was
carefully considered. All the trials were conducted with the same type and
distribution of defects. Table 15 shows the distribution of the seeded defects
per user story. In total, 14 defects were seeded. Three independent researchers
reviewed the representativeness of the requirements specifications and the de-
fects before conducting the experiment trials.
Table 15 Distribution of the seeded defects
User Story Omission Ambiguity Inconsistency Incorrect Fact Total
US1 2 2 2 1 7
US2 2 2 2 1 7
The original (first and second trial) and the new study (third trial) differed
in terms of certain aspects related to the setting of the study. In the original
study 33 subjects participated, divided into two trials with 25 undergraduate
and eight graduate students. In the new study, we involved 23 undergraduate
students. This number of participants was defined according to the availability
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of students to whom we had access and who met our study profile. We con-
ducted the experiments as an in-class activity to have the attendance of most
of our subjects. We motivated the subjects to give their best, while we guar-
anteed the confidentiality of their results. Regarding training, in the original
study we did not provide training on inspection techniques because, at that
time, we considered that our approach and our task description could be self-
assimilated by the students. After the lessons learned from the first study, we
identified that training should be provided in the new study. For that reason,
we provided training on both, our approach and the PBR Black Hat approach.
Additionally, we reminded inspectors to pay attention to the task description
according to the treatment provided. These changes were motivated by the
feedback received by the inspectors in the follow-up questionnaire of the first
two trials. Table 16 presents the main factors involved in the experiments to
summarize the context of the original and the new study.
Table 16 Context factors of the experiments
Context Factors Original Study New Study
Subjects 25 US and 8 GS 23 US
Setting In-class activity In-class activity
Training provided –Security properties and
OWASP
–Type of defects
–Security properties and OWASP
–Type of defects
–Our reading technique and PBR
Black Hat approach
Other changes NA –Reminder to follow the task de-
scription
5.5 Experiment Design
Our experiments were composed of one factor with two treatments: (1) using
our proposed reading technique and (2) using the OWASP high-level SRs (first
two trials) or using the PBR Black Hat approach (third trial). Figure 7 shows
all the phases involved in the experiments.
The study design is composed of a set of artifacts distributed into three
phases. Details of the artifacts used in the experiment are available at Zenodo5.
In the first phase, all the students filled out a characterization questionnaire
with questions about their expertise in the topics related to the study. They
also received training to introduce the main topics. In the second phase, we
obtained quantitative data by conducting the original (first and second trial)
and new study (third trial). The students of all the experiments were divided
into two groups in order to evaluate the performance by executing the review
5 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3966542
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Fig. 7 Experimental design of the study
using or not our approach. Finally, in the third phase, the participants of the
experiments gave us feedback on the execution of the experiment. The instru-
ments used to conduct the experiment are further described in the following.
5.6 Instrumentation
Characterization questionnaire. The goal of the questionnaire is to characterize
the experience of the subjects and identify key characteristics of four topics:
agile software development, RE, software security and inspections.
Training. In the first and second trials, the training was focused on the
security properties, the OWASP high-level SRs and the defect types involved
in the experiment. In the third trial, we included training on how to use each
of the inspection techniques. Furthermore, we provided feedback on common
errors along with the experiments and we emphasize strictly following the task
description of the experiment.
User story and security specifications: The input of our approach is a user
story and its set of security specifications. Therefore, we created the specifi-
cations following the guidelines proposed by Lucassen et al. [35]. They were
based on typical customer requests for developing web applications, e.g., send-
ing sensitive information to other systems and deleting data. When doing so,
we relied as an orientation on SRs specifications from real industrial software
projects as used by our industry partners. We did not use real specifications
verbatim in our setting for confidentiality reasons.
Task description. This document explains to the students how to fill out the
defect reporting form according to their treatment. Both treatments received
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the same specifications. For one treatment (experimental group), the technique
was generated according to the user story and its related OWASP high-level
SRs. For the other treatment (control group), in the first two trials, the list of
the OWASP high-level SRs with the list of the defect types was provided. In
the third trial the control group also received the PBR Black Hat approach.
Defect reporting form. This form was used by subjects to record the start
and end time of the review, as well as the defects by location and type. The
defect reporting form for the experimental group was the one generated for
applying the reading technique in Table 8.
Follow-up questionnaire. This questionnaire was based on the Technology
Acceptance Model (TAM). TAM has been extensively used in several stud-
ies [54]. We wanted to know whether the approach was useful and easy to use.
We included open text questions to gather feedback about the difficulties and
benefits of using our approach.
5.7 Data Collection Procedure
We used the following procedures to collect the data necessary for answering
our research questions and test our hypotheses.
Collect defects found and false positives: Inspectors applied the reading
technique generated by our approach on the given requirements artifacts,
which generated a list of detected defects by each inspector. The same pro-
cess was applied by the remaining treatments involved in the experiments. We
reviewed the output of each inspector in pairs of researchers, and classified a
registry as false positive if it was not a defect. Based on this data, we evaluated
the performance of the treatments in terms of effectiveness, considering only
defects (i.e., true positives).
Collect time spent for detecting defects: In this study, time spent refers
to the amount of time inspectors spent to identify defects. We collected the
time spent by each inspector during the inspection. The time spent is the
difference between the start time and end time. Note that this time does not
include activities such as training and follow-up questionnaire. We defined
1 hour as the maximum time limit to be spent by an inspector to find the
seeded defects. The pilot study was helpful to define the time it would take for
inspectors to complete the inspection task. Based on this data, we evaluated
the performance of the treatments in terms of efficiency.
Collect perceptions of the subjects: Finally, to answer RQ2, we used the
TAM based [54] follow-up questionnaire to collect feedback on the usefulness
and ease of use of our approach and the PBR Black Hat approach.
5.8 Analysis Procedure
We structure our analysis procedure into four steps. Each step leads to the
results necessary for answering one of our research questions.
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Calculate effectiveness and efficiency of the experiment treatments: First,
we analyzed the performance of each treatment by carrying out descriptive
statistics such as the percent of defects detected in the agile specifications and
the time duration to perform the review. Hypotheses testing was also applied.
To this end, the analysis was conducted using the statistical tool RStudio
version 1.1.4. For the hypotheses testing, we used the Mann-Whitney test
with alfa = 0.05. The small number of independent samples motivated this
choice of statistical significance and test. Second, to get a deeper insight into
the defects detection, we analyze the distribution of types of defects identified
by inspectors. This provided answers for RQ1.
Analyze the number of false positives: We know that the reliability of
an inspection technique is important. Therefore, we analyze false positives to
determine to which extent our approach leads inspectors to false positives. We
also analyzed this metric for the approaches compared in the experiments.
Interpret questionnaire answers: We analyze the frequencies of responses
to the TAM questionnaire. Additionally, we conducted a qualitative analysis
applying grounded theory open coding activities to the open questions. This
provided answers to RQ2.
5.9 Operation of the Experiments
The original study (i.e., the first two trials) was conducted in March of 2019
[57], whereas the new study (i.e., the third trial) was conducted in November
of 2019. All trials were executed along two days. On the first day, the subjects
answered the characterization form in order to allow dividing them into ex-
perimental groups. On the second day before the execution of the experiment,
concepts of the security properties, OWASP high-level SRs, and defect types
were reviewed by subjects in a training session. In the case of the new study,
training on the inspection techniques was provided. After that, the inspection
was conducted as follows.
All subjects had up to one hour to finish the review. In the original study,
the control group used the OWASP high-level SRs as support during the re-
view, while in the new study the control group used the PBR Black Hat
approach. The experimental group used our approach. When the subjects fin-
ished the task, they had to fill out the follow-up questionnaire.
6 Results
In the following, we present the results of the trials conducted in the study. We
first describe the results on defect detection effectiveness and efficiency. We also
present more specific results on false positives introduced by inspectors and
the types of defects identified by them. We end by evaluating the perception
of the inspectors on the usefulness and ease of use of our approach.
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6.1 Results on Defect Detection Effectiveness
In this section we present the performance of inspectors in terms of effective-
ness across the trials involved in the experiments. We analyze the number
of defects found by inspectors who used our approach and other inspection
methods with different levels of support. We wanted to understand the po-
tential of our approach to detect security-related defects in agile requirements
specifications of web applications. For this, we compared the performance of
the effectiveness of our approach against the performance of the effectiveness
of inspections conducted with the OWASP high-level SRs and the PBR Black
Hat approach. Figure 8 presents the defect detection effectiveness of each in-
spection technique by showing the distribution of the number of defects found
by the subjects in each experimental trial.
Fig. 8 Defect detection effectiveness across the experiments
It is possible to observe that our approach was more effective than inspec-
tions conducted with the OWASP high-level SRs and the PBR Black Hat ap-
proach. In the original study (first and second trial), both experimental groups
(green block) identified more defects than the control groups (blue block). For
instance, in the first trial of the original study, conducted by undergraduate
students, the experimental group (students who used our approach) identified
in median, 54% defects, while the control group (students who conducted the
inspection by using the OWASP high-level SRs) identified 23%. The difference
was even higher when observing the performance of the second trial conducted
by graduate students. Those who used our approach identified, in median, 69%
of the defects versus 23% identified by the students who did not use it. This
improvement can be explained for two reasons. (1) Often, graduate students
have more experience than undergraduate students since the first ones have
faced several real projects. We showed this trend in our characterization ques-
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tionnaire. On the other hand, (2) in the second trial, we slightly modified the
defect reporting form to ease its understanding and fulfillment. The reason was
that in the first trial several inspectors mentioned that the defect reporting
form was confusing. The change consisted of merging the columns A, IS and
IR to understand better that those defect types do not have a 1 to 1 relation-
ship with the security specifications such as the O column. In other words, we
improved the design of the defect reporting form, while it remained to capture
the same information.
Concerning the third trial (new study) conducted by undergraduate stu-
dents, the effectiveness followed the same pattern as the original study. That
is, students who used our approach identified more defects than students who
used the PBR Black Hat approach. Note that in this trial, the control group
also used the OWASP high-level SRs to support the PBR Black Hat approach.
We decided to provide that support because the PBR Black Hat approach does
not cover all the defect types introduced in the security specifications. It is
noteworthy that the PBR Black Hat approach was not originally designed for
the agile context, however, at the same time, its conception does not exclude
this type of requirements. In the end, the experimental group (green block)
identified, in median, 58% of the defects, while the control group (red block)
identified 38%.
When comparing the results between the new and the original study, we
found that the PBR Black Hat approach (red block) improved the performance
in terms of effectiveness when compared to the inspection conducted using
only the OWASP high-level SRs (blue block). This indicates that the PBR
Black Hat approach also helps in detecting security-related defects. This is
outstanding if we consider that the PBR Black Hat approach was conceived in
2002 under different security concerns than those evaluated in our experiment.
We also wanted to test our null hypothesis on the effectiveness (H01a and
H01b), i.e., we checked whether the differences obtained in our experiments
were significant to affirm or reject the hypotheses. To this end, we used the
Mann-Whitney Test. In that sense, the results of the tests allowed to reject
H01a and H01b for all experimental trials because we obtained p-values of
0.002, 0.012 and 0.004 for the first, second and third trial, respectively. This
means there is a significant difference in terms of effectiveness when using our
approach compared to conducting inspections with the OWASP high-level SRs
and the PBR Black Hat approach. In other words, the amount of defects found
of our approach can be considered significantly high compared to the other
techniques involved in the experiments. Besides, to complement the p values
results, we calculated Cohen’s effect size which is a quantitative measure of
the magnitude of a phenomenon. For all the experiments we obtained values of
3.46, 2.24 and 2.47 for the first, second and third trials, respectively. According
to [55], this values can be considered as very large effect size. Thus, we can
partially answer RQ1: Our approach has a positive impact on defect detection
effectiveness with a very large effect size.
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6.2 Results on Defect Detection Efficiency
After knowing the effectiveness of our approach across the different trials, we
can question its efficiency by analyzing the defects found per hour by the
inspectors. Figure 9 shows the distribution of the efficiency of the subjects
involved in the experiments.
Fig. 9 Defect detection efficiency across the experiments
Note that the efficiency follows the same pattern of the effectiveness, that
is, the number of defects found per hour by the students who used our approach
(green block) was higher than the students who used the OWASP high-level
SRs and the PBR Black Hat approach (blue and red blocks, respectively).
In the original study, both experimental groups, in median, identified more
defects per hour than the control groups. For instance, in the first trial con-
ducted by the undergraduate students, our approach efficiency was 15 defects
found per hour (we seeded 14 defects, but participants took less than one
hour to complete their tasks). In contrast, the median of the undergraduate
students who used only the OWASP high-level SRs was four. In the second
trial conducted by the graduate students, the performance of our approach
improved. The mean of our approach efficiency increased to 21 defects found
per hour versus four defects found per hour by the graduate students who did
not use it. This improvement is proportional to the effectiveness performance
shown in Figure 8. Thus, we can explain these difference across the first two
trials.
In the third trial (new study) conducted by undergraduate students, the
experimental group identified, in median, 22 defects per hour, whereas the
control group identified, in median, ten defects. This means that the inspec-
tors who used our approach identified defects faster than inspectors who used
the OWASP high-level SRs and the PBR Black Hat approach. In this trial, we
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can see that undergraduate students who used our approach performed at the
same level than graduate students (second trial) who used our approach. Un-
der the same conditions, this would not be a typical performance considering
the experience of the inspectors of each group. We believe that the training
provided in the third trial on how our approach works and how the defect
reporting form must be filled out may be a cause of this improvement.
Regarding statistical hypothesis testing for efficiency, we found that the
Mann-Whitney Test suggests rejecting our second null hypotheses (H02a and
H02b) with p-values of 0.02, 0.01 and 0.02 for the first, second and third trial,
respectively. This means there is a significant difference in terms of efficiency
when using our approach against the inspection conducted with the OWASP
high-level SRs and the PBR Black Hat approach. In the same direction, we
found that the relevance of this difference (Cohen’s effect size [55]) was large
for all the experiments (1.56, 3.29 and 2.32 for the first, second and third trials,
respectively). With this information, we can fully answer RQ1. Our approach
has a positive impact on security defect detection effectiveness and efficiency
when compared to directly using the OWASP high-level SRs and to using the
PBR Black Hat approach.
6.3 Results on False Positives
To understand to which extend our approach leads inspectors to report defects
that are not truly defects (false positives), we analyzed the output of each
inspector of the trials to manually and in pairs classify whether the reported
defect concerns a true defect or a false positive. False positives may affect
both efficiency and effectiveness, thus these results provide additional insights
to answer RQ1. Note that this analysis was conducted in pairs of researchers.
We present Figure 10 to provide an overview of the false positives by trial and
groups involved in the experiments.
Fig. 10 Average of false positives by trial and technique
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According to Table 10, we see that all the trials followed the same pattern.
Inspectors who used our approach introduced less false positives than inspec-
tors who conducted the inspection by using the OWASP high-level SRs and
the PBR Black Hat approach. For instance, in the second trial our approach
led the inspectors to introduce, in average, 4.5 false positives while the inspec-
tors who used only the OWASP high-level SRs introduced in average 6.0. In
the third trial, where we evaluated our approach against the PBR Black Hat
approach, we see that our approach led the inspectors to introduce, in average,
1.7 false positives against 5.4 introduced by the inspectors who used the PBR
Black Hat approach. When investigating the possible causes of these findings,
we believe that the context factors involved in each experiment, and which
were presented in Table 16, influenced to improve the results of the third trial
with respect to the first and second one. For instance, we provided additional
training in the new study by teaching the inspectors to follow the task de-
scription and our reading technique. Overall, this can be seen as a benefit of
our approach since this factor is closely tied to software quality assurance. In
other words, if we link these results on false positives with the results on defect
detection effectiveness and efficiency, when using our approach inspectors tend
to find more defects in less time, making less mistakes. Therefore, these results
support again our findings on effectiveness and efficiency presented before.
6.4 Analysis Across Experimental Trials
We present a synthesis of our findings from the first, second and third trial
conducted in this study as follows. We provide overall median scores for effec-
tiveness and efficiency performance in Table 17. In order to provide a high-
level overview of our findings, we rank the results by efficiency performance.
We consider efficiency instead of effectiveness given the importance of time
spent on agile methods. We also present the subject level, undergraduate (U)
or graduate (G), the treatments and the experimental trial number.
Table 17 Overall mean scores of performance sorted by efficiency
Ranking Efficiency
(def/hour)
Effectiveness Level Treatment Trial
1 22 58,4 U Our Approach 3
2 21 68,9 G Our Approach 2
3 15 54,2 U Our Approach 1
4 10 38,3 U PBR Black Hat approach 3
5 4 23,6 G OWASP high-level SRs 2
6 4 23,1 U OWASP high-level SRs 1
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If we compare the performance across the trials we see that the best three
performances were obtained by the inspectors who used our approach. In other
words, experimental group always performed better than control group. Tak-
ing a look at the performance by educational level (undergraduate and grad-
uate), we see that this factor had limited influence on the performance of the
inspectors. In our experiments, performance was mainly defined by the treat-
ment given to inspectors, that is, if a support such as structured technique is
provided, the performance of the inspectors, regardless of his/her education
level, can improve. This is supported by analyzing the performance of the in-
spectors who used the PBR Black Hat approach. These inspectors performed
better than inspectors who did not received support in form of a structured
technique.
6.5 Results on Types of Defects Identified
We also wanted to determine to what extent our approach helps to identify
incomplete, inconsistent, incorrect and ambiguous security-related aspects. Ta-
ble 18 shows the distribution of the defects found per type by each partici-
pant in all the trials. We highlighted the discarded subjects as mentioned in
Section 5.4. For a better understanding of the data shown in Table 18, we
summarize in Table 19 the average percentage of defects found by defect type
according to the techniques involved in the experiments.
We observed that inspectors who used our approach on average identified
92,4% of omission defects. I.e., almost all such defects were identified. Regard-
ing the other defect types, we observed that these inspectors found 45,2% of
ambiguity defects, 60,5% of inconsistency defects, and 42,6% of defects re-
lated to incorrect facts. In total, inspectors who used our approach in average
identified 60% of the seeded defects. In comparison with the performance of
the inspectors who used the PBR Black Hat, they did not perform at the
same level as inspectors who used our approach. For instance, inspectors who
used the PBR Black Hat approach found in average 32,2% of omission defects,
29,5% of ambiguity defects, 54,8% of inconsistent defects and 31% of incorrect
facts defects. Considering all defect types, in average, this group found 40% of
the defects against 60% found by subjects using our approach. The landscape
is even poorer if we compare the performance of the inspectors who conducted
the inspection by using only the OWASP high-level SRs, which in average
found only 23%.
Given these results, we are confident that our approach helps identifying
omission defects, that is, to detect security-related aspects that were not con-
sidered or were not covered by the security specifications originally created by
requirements analysts. We also consider that our approach contributes identi-
fying inconsistency defects since more than half of these defects were identified.
Comparing the other defect types, we see that our approach is slightly better
than the PBR Black Hat approach and the inspection conducted with only
the OWASP high-level SRs.
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Table 18 Detail of the inspectors’ performance in all trials
ID Trial Treatment Time OM % AM % IS % IF %
∑
1 1 Our approach 00:55 4 100 2 50 1 25 0 0 7
2 1 Our approach 01:00 4 100 1 25 1 25 0 0 6
3 1 Our approach 00:48 4 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
4 1 OWASP HLSR 00:50 3 75 1 25 0 0 0 0 4
5 1 OWASP HLSR 00:38 3 75 1 25 3 100 0 0 7
6 1 OWASP HLSR 00:44 2 50 1 25 0 0 0 0 3
7 1 Our approach 00:40 3 75 1 25 2 50 0 0 6
8 1 OWASP HLSR 00:40 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50 1
9 1 OWASP HLSR 00:30 0 0 1 25 0 0 1 50 2
10 1 Our approach 00:50 4 100 0 0 0 0 1 50 5
11 1 Our approach 00:20 4 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
12 1 OWASP HLSR 00:35 0 0 1 25 1 25 0 0 2
13 1 Our approach 00:36 3 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
14 1 OWASP HLSR 00:31 0 0 0 0 2 50 0 0 2
15 1 OWASP HLSR 00:28 0 0 0 0 1 25 0 0 1
16 1 Our approach 00:20 4 100 3 75 2 50 2 100 11
17 1 OWASP HLSR 00:25 1 25 2 50 2 50 0 0 5
18 1 Our approach 00:26 2 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
19 1 Our approach 00:17 4 100 1 25 2 50 0 7
20 1 OWASP HLSR 00:25 0 0 1 25 2 50 0 0 3
21 1 OWASP HLSR 00:25 0 0 2 50 3 100 1 50 6
22 1 Our approach 00:20 4 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
23 1 Our approach 00:20 4 100 1 25 2 50 0 0 7
24 1 Our approach 00:15 4 100 1 25 2 50 0 0 7
25 1 OWASP HLSR 00:15 2 50 0 0 1 25 0 0 3
26 2 OWASP HLSR 00:33 0 0 0 0 1 25 0 0 1
27 2 Our approach 00:35 4 100 2 50 2 50 2 100 10
28 2 Our approach 00:21 4 100 3 75 2 50 0 0 9
29 2 Our approach 00:20 4 100 3 75 2 50 0 0 9
30 2 OWASP HLSR 00:50 0 0 0 0 2 50 0 0 2
31 2 Our approach 00:37 4 100 1 25 2 50 1 50 8
32 2 OWASP HLSR 01:00 0 0 3 75 2 50 1 50 6
33 2 OWASP HLSR 00:40 1 25 1 25 1 25 1 50 4
34 3 Our approach 00:10 2 50 2 50 2 50 1 50 7
35 3 Our approach 00:15 4 100 2 50 3 75 0 0 9
36 3 PBR Black Hat 00:30 1 25 1 25 2 50 1 50 5
37 3 PBR Black Hat 00:24 0 0 1 25 2 50 1 50 4
38 3 Our approach 00:16 3 75 1 25 3 75 1 50 8
39 3 Our approach 00:18 3 75 1 25 2 50 1 50 7
40 3 PBR Black Hat 00:25 1 25 3 75 3 75 0 0 7
41 3 PBR Black Hat 00:26 0 0 0 0 3 75 1 50 4
42 3 Our approach 00:28 4 100 2 50 3 75 1 50 10
43 3 Our approach 00:26 2 50 2 50 2 50 0 0 6
44 3 PBR Black Hat 00:30 2 50 2 50 2 50 1 50 7
45 3 PBR Black Hat 00:28 4 100 0 0 2 50 0 0 6
46 3 Our approach 00:25 4 100 2 50 2 50 1 50 9
47 3 Our approach 00:30 1 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
48 3 Our approach 00:30 2 50 1 25 3 75 1 50 7
49 3 Our approach 00:30 3 75 1 25 2 50 2 100 8
50 3 Our approach 00:31 2 50 1 25 3 75 2 100 8
51 3 PBR Black Hat 00:36 1 25 0 0 2 50 1 50 4
52 3 PBR Black Hat 00:36 4 100 2 50 2 50 1 50 9
53 3 PBR Black Hat 00:43 0 0 2 50 3 75 1 50 6
54 3 PBR Black Hat 00:45 0 0 0 0 3 75 0 0 3
55 3 PBR Black Hat 00:40 1 25 2 50 1 25 0 0 4
56 3 Our approach 00:53 4 100 3 75 3 75 1 50 11
OM: Omission AM: Ambiguity IS: Inconsistency
IF: Incorrect Fact
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Table 19 Distribution of defects found per treatment
Treatment Omission Ambiguity Inconsistency Incorrect Fact Total
OWASP high-level SRs 23,2% 25,8% 36,5% 14,8% 23%
PBR Black Hat +
OWASP
32,8% 29,5% 54,8% 31,8% 40%
Our Approach 92,4% 45,2% 60,5% 42,6% 60%
Note that the results of the ambiguity defect are not very different among
the experiments, that is, neither the support of our technique nor the support
of the PBR Black Hat approach generates a relevant improvement compared
to an ad-hoc inspection (using only OWASP high-level SRs).
Despite promising results in identifying defects of omission and inconsis-
tency, we believe that the verification questions that are part of our approach
should be reviewed to improve its effectiveness. This is specially important
for ambiguity and incorrect fact defects. It is also particularly interesting that
the percentage to identify incorrect fact defects was low in all the inspec-
tions. Probably, this happened due to the additional domain knowledge that
is usually needed to detect such problems. This may indicate the difficulty of
identifying this type of defects is higher than the others. In summary, we must
consider improvements to increase the effectiveness in detecting this kind of
defects.
6.6 Perception of the Inspectors on the Usefulness and Ease of Use
After inspectors conducted the inspection task by reviewing the security spec-
ifications provided in the experiments, we asked whether they found our ap-
proach useful and easy to use. Through the TAM questionnaire [15], we wanted
to know about their perceptions on using our approach and the PBR Black
Hat approach. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the frequencies of the responses
of the inspectors that measures their perception on ease of use and usefulness,
respectively. These figures present green tones that indicate agreement and
red tones that indicate disagreement with our statements of ease of use and
usefulness. Note that dark tones indicate a strong agreement/disagreement
and light tones indicate a partial agreement/disagreement.
We start by analyzing the responses of the inspectors that measures their
perception related to the ease of use of the reading-based approaches. Figure 11
shows the perception of the inspectors for the statement “I found the approach
easy to use”.
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Fig. 11 Perception of the inspectors to the statement “I found the approach easy to use”
First, we can see that the we have a higher concentration of red tones in
the first trial. In this case,
the perception of inspectors about the ease of use improved across the
trials. For instance, in the first trial, 4 out of 13 (31%) strongly or partially
disagreed with the statement “I found the approach easy to use”. Only one
inspector strongly agreed with. In the second and third trial, the picture was
different. Just one out of 15 (6%) inspectors who used our approach in these
trials partially disagreed. The other 14 inspectors partially (8) and strongly
(6) agreed. A large number of disagreements and partial agreements in the
first trial indicated that improvements should be added to facilitate the use
of the approach and then improve the detection of defects. In that direction,
the inspectors proposed some points that could enhance the ease of use of
the approach, such as providing a lighter document, modifying the design
of the defect reporting form and showing an example of how to fill it out
correctly. This feedback was taken into account to perform the second and
third trials. In fact, as mentioned in Section 6.1, the inspectors’ defect detection
effectiveness improved, in our opinion, because we introduced some changes to
the defect reporting form such as merging the columns related to ambiguous,
inconsistency and incorrect facts, and simplifying the number of steps in the
task description document.
When comparing the perception of ease of use of the approaches involved
in the third trial (our approach against the PBR Black Hat approach), we see
that, in principle, inspectors found our approach easier to use. For instance,
nine of the inspector who used the PBR Black Hat approach partially agreed
and none of them strongly agreed with the sentence about ease of use. This
indicates they faced difficulties to follow the inspection under its guidance. In
contrast, seven inspectors who used our approach partially agreed and three
strongly that the approach was easy to use.
We were also interested in knowing the perception of the inspectors in
relation to the usefulness of the approach. We defined usefulness as a metric
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of productivity based on efficiency. More specifically, we asked whether using
the approach would improve their performance when conducting the security
requirements inspection (find defects faster). Table 12 gives an insight into the
perception of the inspectors related to the usefulness of our approach.
Fig. 12 Perception of the inspectors to the statement “Using the approach improved my
performance (find defects faster)”
In this case, the perception of the inspectors regarding the usefulness of our
approach in the trials was, in general, positive. For instance, all the inspectors
who used our approach (28) partially or strongly agreed with the sentence we
provided about usefulness. More specifically, 12 out of them (43%) strongly
agreed and 16 (57%) partially agreed. However, note that most of the partial
agreements were reported in the first trial (10 out of 16). This perception
arises from the difficulties faced by the inspectors in that trial. For example,
one inspector stated the following: “The review may be exhausting and time-
consuming because the task description document is not lightweight”. Another
one stated: “It would be better to automate the proposal”. The inspectors also
mentioned some difficulties faced, such as “The verification questions could
indicate better how to identify defects such as ambiguity or incorrect facts”.
We believe these barriers may affect the performance of the inspectors and,
thus, the perception of usefulness.
Concerning the perception of the inspectors who used the PBR Black Hat
approach in the third trial, we observed that most of the inspectors found it
useful. In this case, just one inspector partially disagreed with the sentence
about the usefulness we provided. 8 out of 11 (73%) partially agreed and 2
out of 11 (18%) strongly agreed. This reinforces the idea that novice inspec-
tors need support to review security-related aspects. Therefore, approaches
addressing these concerns help to identify defects that would not be easily
identified by ad-hoc inspections.
Nevertheless, if we compare the perception of usefulness between our ap-
proach and the PBR Black Hat approach, we see that more inspectors strongly
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agreed with our approach. This reflects that inspectors felt more comfortable
using our approach. Also, this perception is aligned with the performance of
inspectors across the trials, since inspectors who used our approach performed
better than inspectors who did not use it.
In summary, to the question of how do the inspectors perceive the useful-
ness and ease of use of our approach, we have that inspectors who used our
approach found it, in principle, easy to use and usefulness. Indeed, the percep-
tion of the inspectors was positive in comparison with other security inspection
techniques. However, we have several challenges to improve these aspects, such
as automating our approach and improving the security verification questions.
7 Threats to Validity
We report several threats to validity following the recommendations by Wohlin
et al [58] that we considered or mitigated during the design and execution of
the original and new study.
7.1 Internal validity
First, aiming to avoid personal bias, we used researcher triangulation to collect
and analyze all data. The profile of researchers varies in relation to experience
but remains in relation to the application domain, in this case, software engi-
neering. One master and one Ph.D student in informatics with the supervision
of one senior researcher were involved in this research triangulation. We care-
fully reviewed the extraction of defects and calculation of the percentages of
performance of the inspectors.
Second, we characterized all the subjects with the aim of removing con-
founding factors. The characterization allowed us to apply the blocking prin-
ciple by distributing the participants so that these characteristics were equally
distributed among the experimental and control groups. Table 12 highlights
the subjects who were chosen because of the partition principle. Random as-
signment was employed for subjects with similar characteristics.
We also consider that the performance of participants could be affected if
inspectors try to guess the purpose of the experiment. In the original study,
participants were not aware of the existence of experimental versus control
groups or whether they belonged to different groups. Participants were told
only that they were supposed to perform the task of detecting security-related
defects based on a given requirements specifications. Thus single blinding was
used to minimize biases. Regarding the new study, participants were aware of
the group treatment because we introduce them both the inspection techniques
involved in the experiment. We examined the responses by the groups to see
if they resembled closely with treatment responses. However, we did not find
any evidence of treatment diffusion across the groups.
Finally, regarding training, we provided the same examples of user stories,
defects, security specifications and controls to the experimental and control
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group of all the trials, so any potential bias is similar for all the subjects. In
summary, participants received the same training.
7.2 Construct validity
In our evaluation, we analyzed the suitability of our approach in terms of
the number of defects detected, defect types and number of false positives.
To this end, quantitative analysis was performed. We used metrics such as
effectiveness and efficiency that are commonly used in inspection studies that
are empirically evaluated. We also analyzed the perceptions on usefulness and
ease of use of the inspectors when using our approach and the PBR Black Hat
approach. To this evaluation, qualitative analysis was considered. We used the
TAM questionnaire [15], which has also been widely used and evaluated [54]
to measure the acceptances of techniques, applications and technologies.
7.3 Conclusion validity
Reliability of measures is an important consideration to draw valid conclusions
about the results. We used the Mann-Whitney Test with the aim of determin-
ing whether we reject or not our null hypotheses. The decision of using this
method was supported according to the distribution of our independent sam-
ples, in this case, the treatments of the experiments. Besides statistical signifi-
cance, we used the Cohen’s h metric that is a measure of distance between two
proportions or probabilities. With this, we determine whether the difference
of our results can be considered as small, medium, or large. In our study, we
found the relevance scores of the experimental group was significantly better
than the control group.
Regarding number of participants, we had 56 participants divided into
groups that characterize different samples. Factors such as type of study (orig-
inal and new), position of the students (undergraduate and graduate) and type
of treatment (experimental and control) were considered among the experi-
ments.
7.4 External validity
To mitigate this kind of validity threat, the sample population should be rep-
resentative of the population we want to evaluate. Regarding the subject rep-
resentativeness, we used students to represent novice inspectors. Using stu-
dents as subjects remains a valid simplification of real-life settings needed in
laboratory contexts [22]. In the studies, participants are representative of stu-
dents in computer science enrolled in two different graduate and undergraduate
courses. For all of them, we provided concepts related to security principles
and inspection techniques. Regarding the objects, we created the agile speci-
fications following the quality guidelines proposed by Lucassen [35]. We also
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peer-reviewed the requirements specifications and the seeded defects in terms
of their representativeness. Through the new study, we have demonstrated the
applicability of the requirements specifications created in identifying security-
related defects. As we planned to conduct a limited amount of trials with a
limited amount of subjects, the experiment package is available for external
replications.
8 Discussion
This work brought up several further questions that have strong implications
on future research. Therefore, in the following, we discuss several of these
aspects in more depth.
8.1 Suitability of the OWASP high-level SRs
We are aware that not all OWASP high-level SRs might be useful in all situ-
ations. However, we are confident that as a starting point it is useful to have
a basis that allows novice inspectors, at least, to consider the basic needs to
deal with security.
8.2 Generalization of our approach
We know that not only security is challenging in agile projects. Indeed, it seems
that other NFRs such as maintainability and performance are often ignored
or ill-defined in this context. Moreover, plan-driven software projects may face
similar problems. This provides an opportunity to extend our approach, e.g.,
considering other types of inputs such as open textual requirements and cov-
ering other quality characteristics such as portability and usability. Currently,
knowledge on the available verification techniques to assure these quality char-
acteristics are met is scattered and limited. Furthermore, those techniques
are commonly not properly integrated into the agile development philosophy.
Thus, we consider this, a first step in this direction was conducted by investi-
gating security, a specific product quality characteristic.
8.3 Implications of our research for practitioners
Unfortunately, security problems tend to be postponed to later stages [47].
For practitioners, our approach provides a way to detect defects related to se-
curity aspects that should be specified. According to the results of the original
and new study, we are confident to say that in principle our approach sup-
ports novice inspectors by providing guidance in applying a reading technique
that will help them to identify defects in agile requirements specifications of
web applications. In addition, we designed the approach in such a way that it
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works without expensive review cycles, aligned with the agile philosophy. We
see three main potential benefits of this approach. First, narrowing the secu-
rity knowledge gap that exists between experts and novice inspectors. Second,
the reading technique provides a strong focus on security aspects. In this way,
the team can avoid discussing obvious issues and focus on important, difficult,
security-specific aspects of the review. Third, we saw that our approach pro-
vided positive results regarding the performance of individual inspectors when
conducting the security inspection.
8.4 Implications of our research for researchers
This work contributes already to closing an important literature gap that exists
with respect to security requirements verification in the agile context. Based
on the scarce literature on the topic, we believe that our approach constitutes
an interesting starting point to discuss in depth verification activities centered
on security in agile contexts. For us, the results strengthen our confidence in
further extending our approach to scale its usability up to practical settings
covering a full, tool-supported process integration, which was not (and could
not be) in scope of a development in our research-centric environment.
8.5 Limitations
We concentrated on a set of specific security properties and high-level SRs
from the OWASP (matching security sub-characteristics also described in the
SQuaRE quality model). There are several security standards that are different
from the ones provided by OWASP. Thus, we could complement the security
vision of our approach with other standards.
Moreover, given the complexity of working with NLP in RE, there is a
limitation related to the completeness of the keyword repository needed to
link the user stories with the security properties. To deal with this, we decided
to consider synonyms regarding the initial set of keywords.
We only evaluated our approach with a use case scenario (two user stories
with their security specifications) as a starting point for detecting defects
related to security. However, additional use cases can also be provided as
input to the participants and may give us insights on the suitability of our
approach in different contexts. We are currently designing an industrial case
study to evaluate the coverage of detecting security defects by our approach for
a real software system. The results will provide evidence on how the approach
generalizes when applied with the help of security analysts without the time
and other experimental constraints.
We are also aware that the security specifications involved in the exper-
iments constitute a limitation of the study. In a perfect scenario, we would
have security concerns specified by companies or independent practitioners,
but often this information is restricted. Therefore, we invested our best efforts
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to carefully create and verify the specifications on their representativeness.
Nevertheless, external replications, including a wider range of user stories and
security specifications, are needed to improve external validity of our results.
9 Concluding Remarks
This work addresses a gap in the literature concerning the absence of verifi-
cation techniques for security in agile requirements engineering and its lack of
empirical evidence. It is well-known that the poor definition of NFRs, mini-
mum documentation and lack of requirements verification are among the most
important concerns of software requirements engineering researchers [13], [41].
Therefore, we presented an approach for reviewing security-related aspects
in agile requirements specifications of web applications, which we empirically
evaluated via three controlled experiment trials. In the following, we sum-
marize our conclusions and we discuss potential practical implications of our
research.
The three trials concerned evaluating the effectiveness, efficiency, useful-
ness and ease of use of our approach when compared to an ad-hoc inspection
supported with the OWASP high-level SRs and another one supported with
the PBR Black Hat approach. In the combined analysis of all the controlled
experiments, participants in the experimental group performed significantly
better than participants in the control group in terms of effectiveness and effi-
ciency, i.e., participants who used our approach identified more defects in less
time than participants who did not use it. We also identified that participants
who used our approach found it, in principle, useful and easy to use.
Future work includes evaluating the performance of using our approach in
industrial settings. We want to reach out to better understand the performance
of using our approach in real settings, as well as further information to help us
better addressing practitioners needs. Therefore, we might have to provide tool
support for the application of our approach, in such a way that, for instance,
applying the reading technique could be guided by the FESRAS framework.
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